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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Joseph Emmett Simmonds, III, pled guilty in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands to one count of arson in 
violation of federal law and to one count of bur glary in 
violation of Virgin Islands territorial law. Simmonds 
contends on appeal that the District Court: (1) 
miscalculated the appropriate amount of r estitution by 
including the value of the victims' lost insurance premium 
discounts and the depreciation attributable to the victims' 
furniture in its restitution or der, (2) abused its discretion 
by ordering him to serve consecutive (rather than 
concurrent) sentences for his crimes, and (3) committed 
plain error by consulting the Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Reports of his co-defendants before sentencing him. For the 
reasons detailed below, we will reverse the District Court's 
restitution order with respect to the inclusion of the victims' 
lost insurance premium discounts, but we will affirm the 
District Court's decision in all other respects. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
On September 16, 1998, Simmonds, along with five other 
men, drove to the Peterborg area of St. Thomas, intending 
to burglarize the house located at 11-22 Peterborg. 
Simmonds and his five co-defendants cased the house and, 
after concluding that the residents wer e not at home, cut 
the alarm system wiring which activated both an audible 
alarm within the home and an alert at ADT Security 
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Systems, the monitoring company. All but one of the men 
then entered the house through a partially open window.1 
 
While searching the house for items to steal, one of the 
men, Adaryll Gumbs, came upon the credentials of 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Curtis Gomez and r ealized that the 
house belonged to Gomez. Gumbs recognized Gomez's 
name because Gomez had prosecuted Gumbs in a r obbery 
case that was still pending in the Vir gin Islands Territorial 
Court. On discovering that the house belonged to Gomez, 
Gumbs and Simmonds searched the house for documents 
pertaining to the case against Gumbs. After an 
unsuccessful search, Gumbs and Simmonds decided to set 
the house on fire. Gumbs directed the other three men to 
leave the house and turned on the gas stove without 
igniting the burners. Gumbs and Simmonds then cut up a 
couch and set the couch on fire. All six menfled the scene. 
Gomez and St. Thomas police officers, responding to 
notification of the alarm from ADT , arrived in time to 
observe the suspects fleeing the scene. 
 
All six suspects were eventually arrested. Simmonds was 
arrested on November 9, 1998. During questioning, 
Simmonds confessed to his involvement in the bur glary and 
the arson and gave the police a statement implicating the 
other five men. Simmonds was charged with arson in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 844(i), carrying afirearm during the 
commission of a violent crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(1), and possession of a fir earm by an unlawful user 
of a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(3). He was also charged with burglary in violation 
of territorial law, 14 V.I.C. S 444. In exchange for 
Simmonds' pleading guilty to arson and burglary, the 
government dropped the other char ges against him and 
agreed to recommend to the sentencing court a downward 
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. On May 18, 
1999, Simmonds was sentenced to 97 months in prison for 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) (arson) and a consecutive 
sentence of 5 years in prison for violation of 14 V .I.C. S 444 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At least two of the six men were ar med. Adaryll Gumbs was armed 
with a .22 caliber handgun given to him by Simmonds, and Simmonds 
himself was armed with a .38 caliber chr ome plated handgun. 
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(burglary). Simmonds was also order ed to pay restitution to 
the victims in the amount of $20,000. Simmonds appealed 
the sentence imposed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands had subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612, which grants the District Court for the Virgin 
Islands concurrent jurisdiction over criminal matters that 
involve violations of both federal and territorial law. We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a), which grant us the power to 
review on appeal certain federal sentencing decisions. 
 
We review a restitution order"under a bifurcated 
standard: plenary review as to whether r estitution is 
permitted by law, and abuse of discretion as to the 
appropriateness of the particular award." United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir . 1999). With respect to 
Simmonds's claim that the District Court err ed by awarding 
the "replacement value" of the destr oyed furniture, we 
apply plenary review to the issue of whether"value" 
includes "replacement value." See United States v. Shugart, 
176 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999). If we determine that 
"replacement value" is permitted under the statute, we then 
review the District Court's factual basis for choosing 
"replacement value," as opposed to "market value," for 
abuse of discretion. See id. 
 
With respect to Simmonds's contention that as a matter 
of law the District Court erred by including in its restitution 
order the value of the victims' lost "clean renewal discount" 
and "no claim discount" from their insurance premiums, we 
exercise plenary review. See Crandon , 173 F.3d at 125. 
 
We review the District Court's decision to impose a 
consecutive, rather than a concurrent, sentence for abuse 
of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Spiers, 82 F.3d 
1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1996). The issue underlying that 
decision, however, i.e., whether the Sentencing Guidelines 
apply to the overall sentence imposed when a defendant is 
sentenced simultaneously for a territorial and a federal 
offense, is an issue of law and our review is plenary. 
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Finally, because Simmonds did not contemporaneously 
object to the District Court's decision to consult his co- 
defendants' Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports at 
sentencing, our review is for plain err or. See, e.g., United 
States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The District Court's Restitution Or der 
 
Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (the 
"MVRA"), codified at 18 U.S.C. S 3663A, the District Court 
ordered Simmonds to pay $20,000 as his share of the 
restitution owed to the victims and to the victims' 
insurance company. The District Court concluded that the 
total loss resulting from the criminal acts in question was 
$76,454. The court arrived at this sum based on 
information contained in Simmonds's Pr e-Sentence 
Investigation Report. The victims' insurance company paid 
a total of $65,939 for the loss caused by the fir e. In 
addition, the court ordered restitution in the amount of 
$2,000 to cover the insurance deductible paid by the 
victims, $7,000 representing the depr eciation attributable 
to the furniture destroyed in thefire, and $1,516 
representing the "clean renewal discount" and "no claim 
discount" lost as a result of the insurance claim filed by the 
victims. Simmonds argues that the District Court erred by 
requiring him to compensate the victims for the 
depreciation attributable to furnitur e destroyed in the fire 
and for the value of the lost "clean renewal discount" and 
"no claim discount" because the District Court is prohibited 
by statute from awarding this type of r estitution. 
 
As its name suggests, the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1996, mandates 
that defendants who are convicted of or plead guilty to 
certain crimes pay restitution to their victims. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3663A(a)(1). The parties agree that Simmonds is 
subject to the provisions of the MVRA by virtue of his guilty 
plea to the federal offense of arson. Under the MVRA, a 
defendant must either return the pr operty damaged during 
commission of the crime in question or, if the defendant 
cannot do so, pay "an amount equal to the gr eater of the 
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value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or 
destruction; or the value of the property on the date of 
sentencing, less the value (as of the date the pr operty is 
returned) of any part of the property that is returned." 18 
U.S.C. S 3663A(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Because the 
property at issue in this case was destr oyed, returning it is 
impossible. Therefore, we must deter mine whether the 
District Court's inclusion of the depreciation attributable to 
furniture destroyed in the fir e and of the value of the 
victims' lost insurance premium discounts was proper 
under the statute. We will consider each of the items in 
turn. 
 
1. The Depreciation Attributable to the Victims' Furniture 
 
We first consider whether the District Court erred in 
calculating the value of the victims' furnitur e destroyed in 
the fire under S 3663A at its "r eplacement value" rather 
than at its "market value." "Market value" refers to the 
actual price that the furniture in question would have 
commanded on the open market on the date of destruction. 
"Replacement value," in contrast, refers to the amount of 
money necessary to replace the furnitur e. "Replacement 
value" exceeds "market value" by an amount equal to the 
depreciation attributable to the furnitur e. Depreciation 
represents a decrease in the value of the victims' furniture 
due to use and reflects the fact that the victims' furniture 
was no longer new when destroyed. 
 
Pursuant to the victims' homeowners insurance policy, 
their insurance company, Lloyd's of London, compensated 
the victims for the market value of their destr oyed 
furniture. The District Court, in opting for the "replacement 
value," ordered Simmonds to pay r estitution to Lloyd's of 
London in an amount equal to the market value of the 
furniture and to pay restitution to the victims in an amount 
equal to the depreciation attributable to their furniture. The 
sum of these two amounts, the market value of the 
furniture and the depreciation attributable to the furniture, 
is equal to the replacement value of the fur niture. 
 
Simmonds argues that by including the depr eciation 
attributable to the furniture in its r estitution order, the 
District Court exceeded its statutory authority to order 
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restitution in an amount equal to "the value of the property 
on the date of . . . destruction." 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(I). We must, ther efore, determine whether 
the District Court's decision to order r estitution in an 
amount equal to the "replacement value," rather than equal 
to the "market value," of the destroyed furniture was proper 
under S 3663A. 
 
This question is one of first impression in the Third 
Circuit. In arguing that the District Court's restitution 
order was proper, the gover nment relies primarily on the 
legislative history of the MVRA and the Victim Witness 
Protection Act (the "VPWA"), 18 U.S.C. S 3663(b)(1), as well 
as case law interpreting the language of the VPWA,2 all of 
which indicate that the purpose of both the VPW A and the 
MVRA is, to the extent possible, to make victims whole, to 
fully compensate victims for their losses, and to r estore 
victims to their original state of well-being. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1991); S. 
Rep. No. 104-179, at 12-13, 17-22 (1996) r eprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925-26, 930-35. Thus, when viewed 
solely against the backdrop of congressional intent as set 
forth in the relevant legislative history, the District Court's 
restitution order with respect to the victims' furniture 
appears to be appropriate. This Court, however , has 
interpreted more narrowly these br oad statements of 
congressional intent: 
 
       [T]here is no doubt that the VWPA does not necessarily 
       authorize a sentencing court to order r estitution in an 
       amount that represents a victim's entir e loss. See 
       Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). 
       Congress simply did not write the VWPA to fully satisfy 
       the more ambitious purpose expressed in the legislative 
       reports upon which [the government] relies. The plain 
       and unambiguous language of S 3663(b)(1) clearly 
       limits the amount of restitution to the value of the lost 
       property. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The language of S 3663(b)(1) (the VWP A) and S 3663A(b)(1) (the 
relevant portion of the MVRA) is identical  in all relevant respects. 
Therefore, absent unique and highly persuasive MVRA legislative history, 
of which there is none, Third Circuit cases interpreting the language of 
the S 3663(b)(1) control in this case. 
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Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 46 
(3d Cir. 1994). Thus, we cannot simply defer to the 
sweeping language in the MVRA's legislative history in 
deciding whether the District Court exceeded its statutory 
authority by ordering restitution in an amount equal to the 
"replacement value" of the victims' fur niture. 
 
Looking, however, at the plain language ofS 3663A, it 
states that a district court judge must awar d restitution to 
victims in an amount equal to "the value of the property on 
the date of the damage, loss, or destruction." 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(I). While the statute does not expressly 
define "value" as "replacement value," neither does it define 
value as "market value." In fact, the statute is silent as to 
which of these two measures should be used to determine 
the value of the victims' furniture. Ultimately, we are 
presented with a statute (the primary and overarching goal 
of which is to make victims of crime whole, to fully 
compensate these victims for their losses and to r estore 
these victims to their original state of well-being) that 
expressly directs the sentencing judge to award restitution 
in an amount equal to "the value of the pr operty on the 
date of the damage, loss, or destruction." 
 
Although we have yet to decide whether the ter m "value" 
as used in S 3663A contemplates a restitution order based 
on "replacement value" rather than "fair market value," the 
Eleventh Circuit recently addressed this very question, 
concluding that "value" in S 3663A "contemplates a 
restitution order based on replacement cost where actual 
cash value is unavailable or unreliable." See Shugart, 176 
F.3d at 1375. Moreover, the court in Shugart concluded 
that, in some situations, replacement value is an 
appropriate measure of "value" underS 3663A. Id. 
 
The Shugart court, in attempting to deter mine the 
appropriate measure of "value" underS 3663A(b)(1) for a 
church burned down by the two defendants, reasoned that: 
 
        Section 3663A(b)(1) requires the defendants to pay 
       restitution in an amount equal to the "value" of the 
       Church on the day they burned it down. For fungible 
       commodities, value is easy to determine: it's the actual 
       cash value, or fair market value, of the item--that is, 
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       "[t]he fair or reasonable cash price for which the 
       property could be sold in the market in the or dinary 
       course of business." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 35 (6th ed. 
       1990). According to the defendants, S 3663A always 
       limits restitution to actual cash value. . . . We disagree. 
 
        Although fair market value will often be an accurate 
       measure of the value of property, it will not always be 
       so. Where actual cash value is difficult to ascertain-- 
       because an item is unique, or because there is not a 
       broad and active market for it--replacement cost may 
       be a better measure of value. 
 
Id. While there is no indication that the destroyed furniture 
in this case was "unique," furnitur e often has a personal 
value to its owners that cannot be captured or accurately 
estimated by simply determining the market value of the 
furniture. Replacing the armchair one sits upon each 
evening or the bed one sleeps in each night with fur niture 
that others have already used may be difficult to accept. 
This would be necessary, however, if the household 
furniture is replaced at its market value because damaged 
furniture cannot be replaced at market value with 
equivalent new items. For that reason, when evaluating 
personal items of furniture in one's r esidence, we find that 
replacement value may be an appropriate measure of 
"value" under S 3663A(b)(1). In these circumstances, the 
market value or cash value is an inadequate or inferior 
measure of "value." 
 
This interpretation of "value," as the term is used in 
S 3663A(b)(1), is not only consistent with the Shugart 
court's reasoning and with the clear legislative intent 
behind the MVRA, but also with the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines and with other cases addressing the issues of 
restitution and loss valuation where value is difficult to 
ascertain.3 Moreover , this interpretation of "value" is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See United States v. Sharp, 927 F .2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that the replacement cost of a ventilation fan destroyed when two 
defendants bombed a mine was properly awar ded as restitution to 
victims of the bombing under 18 U.S.C. S 3663(b)(1)); cf. United States v. 
Akbani, 151 F.3d 774, 779-80 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[I]n cases that result in 
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consistent with 18 U.S.C. S 3664, the statutory provision 
immediately following S 3663A, which per mits a sentencing 
court to order "in-kind" restitution"in the form of 
replacement of property." 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(4)(B) 
(emphasis added). We hold, therefor e, that the District 
Court properly considered "replacement value" as a 
measure of restitution and that it did not abuse its 
discretion under the circumstances of this case in then 
choosing it as the applicable measure in its award. 
 
We conclude by noting that the rule of lenity is 
inapplicable in this case. As the Shugart court stated: 
 
       We only invoke the rule of lenity when, after 
       considering the structure and purpose of a criminal 
       statute, we are left with nothing more than a guess as 
       to what Congress intended. See United States v. Wells, 
       519 U.S. 482, 498-99 (1997). In this case, we see no 
       "grievous ambiguity" sufficient to r equire application of 
       the rule of lenity. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 
       453, 463 (1991) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 
       415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)). 
 
Shugart, 176 F.3d at 1376. Similarly, in the present case, 
we are not left with "nothing more than a guess as to what 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
damage to or loss or destruction of property, .. . [t]he language of the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act("VWPA") . . . restricts restitution . . 
. 
to the replacement value of the property." (citing 18 U.S.C. S 
3663(b)(1)); 
United States v. Pemberton, 904 F.2d 515, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Being 
unique, the drawings were not fungible items for which there was a 
broad and active market; [i]n the absence of such a market, which would 
have supplied a readily ascertainable price, the court acted reasonably in 
relying upon the contract between Comstock's employer and the 
developer, the only parties with an immediate interest in the drawings, 
as an indication of value."); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2B1.1, 
application note 2 (1990) ("Where the market value is difficult to 
ascertain or inadequate to measure harm to the victim, the court may 
measure loss in some other way, such as r easonable replacement cost to 
the victim."); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ManualS 2Q2.1, application 
note 4 (1995) ("Where the fair-market retail price is difficult to 
ascertain, 
the court may make a reasonable estimate using any reliable 
information, such as the reasonable r eplacement or restitution cost or 
the acquisition and preservation (e.g., taxider my) cost."). 
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Congress intended." Both the statutory language and the 
legislative history of the VWPA and the MVRA clearly 
indicate Congress's intent to make victims of crime whole, 
to fully compensate these victims for their losses, and to 
restore these victims to their original state of well-being. In 
light of the clear, overarching goal ofS 3663A, there is not 
only no "grievous ambiguity" with respect to Congress's 
intent, there is also no reason to conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion here by opting for the 
replacement value of the victims' furniture rather than the 
market value. 
 
2. The "Clean Renewal Discount" and"No Claim Discount" 
 
Having concluded that the District Court properly 
included the depreciation attributable to the victims' 
furniture in its restitution or der, we must now determine 
whether the District Court erred by including in its 
restitution order the amount of the victims' lost "clean 
renewal discount" and "no claim discount." Because the 
victims' lost insurance premium discounts do not 
constitute "property" that was damaged lost or destroyed by 
the criminal acts of Simmonds and his co-defendants, we 
will reverse the District Court's restitution order with 
respect to these amounts. 
 
The victims' "clean renewal discount" and"no claim 
discount" refer to the amount of money (in the form of 
lower home owners insurance premiums) that the victims 
would have saved had they not been forced tofile an 
insurance claim for the fire damage r esulting from the 
arson committed by Simmonds and his co-defendants. In 
arguing that the District Court erred in ordering restitution 
for the value of the victims' lost insurance pr emium 
discounts, Simmonds contends that the plain language of 
the controlling statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3663A(b)(1), allows the 
District Court to award restitution only in an amount 
representing the value of property lost or destroyed as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activity. Simmonds 
further contends that neither the victims' "clean renewal 
discount" nor their "no claim discount" is property that was 
lost, damaged or destroyed as a result of Simmonds' 
crimes. 
 
                                11 
  
As we have previously interpreted the ter m "property" in 
S 3663A(b)(1), it does not include consequential damages. 
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41 
(3d Cir. 1994). In Davis, the defendant, who pled guilty in 
federal district court to charges of conspiracy to commit 
fraud, forgery, and perjury, argued on appeal that the 
district court improperly ordered as restitution the amount 
of legal fees incurred by the victim to r ecover property 
fraudulently obtained by the defendant. In r eviewing the 
district court's restitution order , the Davis Court, 
highlighting the controlling statutory language, concluded 
that S 3663(b)(1) expressly limits r estitution to the value of 
the property that was damaged, lost or destr oyed during or 
as a direct result of the criminal acts in question. Relying 
on opinions from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits holding that "r estitution under the VWPA 
cannot include consequential damages,"4  the Davis Court 
held that consequential damages, such as attor neys' fees, 
are not recoverable in restitution under S 3663(b)(1). Davis, 
43 F.3d at 46. 
 
Consistent with our holding in Davis, we conclude that 
the District Court erred by including the value of the 
victims' "clean renewal discount" and"no claim discount" in 
its restitution order. The victims' lost insurance premium 
discounts are unquestionably a result of the defendant's 
criminal conduct. However, under S 3663A as we have 
interpreted it, the victims' lost insurance pr emium 
discounts are consequential damages and do not in any 
way constitute or represent "the value of the property" lost, 
damaged or destroyed as a result of Simmonds's crimes. 
The District Court exceeded its statutory authorization in 
ordering restitution for the victims' lost"clean renewal 
discount" and "no claim discount," and we will, therefore, 
reverse the District Court's grant of r estitution with respect 
to these items. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See United States v. Mullins, 971 F .2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir.1992); 
United States v. Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 497 (7th Cir.1990); United 
States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Patty, 992 F.2d 1045, 1049 (10th Cir .1993); United States v. Mitchell, 
876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989). 
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B. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 
 
Simmonds next argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by ordering his territorial sentence to run 
consecutively, rather than concurrently, with his federal 
sentence. Simmonds contends that the District Court was 
required to determine whether "the sentence imposed on 
the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is 
adequate to achieve the total punishment," U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual S 5G1.2(c) (2000),5 and to consider the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. S 3553, including the need 
for deterrence, punishment and restitution, the nature and 
seriousness of the offense, the kinds of sentences available 
for the crime in question and similar crimes, the need to 
protect the public, and the need for criminal r ehabilitation, 
before ordering his territorial sentence to run consecutively 
(rather than concurrently) to his federal sentence. See 18 
U.S.C. SS 3584, 3553 (2000). Simmonds contends that 
because the District Court failed to apply U.S.S.G.S 5G1.2 
and to consider the factors enumerated in S 3553(a), his 
sentence must be vacated and his case remanded to the 
District Court for re-sentencing. 
 
We have previously held that the Sentencing Guidelines 
do not apply to sentences for violations of V irgin Islands 
territorial law. See Government of the V irgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 866 F.2d 610, 613-15 (3d Cir . 1989). The 
Sentencing Guidelines apply only to sentences for federal 
criminal violations and do not apply to sentences for 
territorial criminal violations regardless of whether such 
sentences are imposed by the District Court for the Virgin 
Islands or the Virgin Islands T erritorial Court. See id. In the 
present case, however, we are called upon to address a 
more nuanced question. We must deter mine whether the 
factors, set forth at 18 U.S.C. S 3553 andS 5G1.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, apply when federal and territorial 
criminal charges are joined for trial and sentencing in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. U.S.S.G. S 5G1.2(c) provides that"[i]f the sentence imposed on the 
count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve 
the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts shall run 
concurrently, except to the extent otherwise r equired by law." U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 5G1.2(c) (2000). 
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District Court for the Virgin Islands. 6 As detailed below, we 
conclude that as a matter of law neither S 3553 or S 5G1.2 
applies in such a situation. We hold, ther efore, that the 
District Court properly did not apply the Guidelines in its 
imposition of the sentence for the territorial of fense and 
that, when the District Court ordered Simmonds to serve 
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for his 
crimes without reference to S 3553 or S 5G1.2, it did not 
abuse its discretion. 
 
At oral argument, Simmonds urged that 48 U.S.C. 
S 1614(b) (which mandates that certain federal criminal 
procedures be applied in the District Court for the Virgin 
Islands) required that the District Court consider at 
sentencing the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a). We 
disagree. As Simmonds concedes, if the District Court were 
required, pursuant to 48 U.S.C. S 1614(b), to consider the 
factors set forth in S 3553(a) when deciding whether his 
sentence for burglary should run consecutively or 
concurrently to his federal sentence for arson, then the 
District Court would also be required to apply the 
Sentencing Guidelines when deciding this issue. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(a)(4)(A), (a)(5), and (b). Specifically, sections 
3553(a)(4) and 3553(a)(5) state that a sentencing court 
must consider both "the kinds of sentence and the 
sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category 
of offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to S 944(a)(1) of title 28," 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(4), and "any pertinent policy statement 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . that is in effect 
on the date the defendant is sentenced." 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(a)(5). Moreover, 18 U.S.C.S 3553(b) introduces 
additional factors to be considered: 
 
       The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and 
       within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless 
       the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
       mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degr ee, not 
       adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Sentencing Guidelines do apply of course in computing the 
sentence imposed for the federal arson conviction. 
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       Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
       result in a sentence different fr om that described. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(b). 
 
If, therefore, S 3553 had been applicable when a sentence 
was being imposed on Simmonds for his conviction on the 
territorial offense, the District Court would also have been 
required to apply S 5G1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
to impose a total sentence within the range established for 
the adjusted combined offense level. However , pursuant to 
our holding in Dowling, the Sentencing Guidelines do not 
apply with respect to territorial criminal of fenses tried in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands. See Dowling, 866 
F.2d at 615. 
 
Moreover, S 5G1.2 of the Guidelines, entitled "Sentencing 
on Multiple Counts of Conviction," is applicable to 
sentencing on multiple federal counts of conviction. That 
this section is so limited can be ascertained fr om its 
reference to Part D of Chapter 3 of the Guidelines, "Multiple 
Counts," which in turn makes it clear in its Introductory 
Commentary that Part D is establishing methods of 
determining a single offense level when there are multiple 
offenses of conviction under Chapter 2 of the Guidelines. 
All offenses under Chapter 2 are violations of federal -- not 
of state or territorial -- statutes.7  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although the Government argues that S 5G1.3, "Imposition of a 
Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischar ged term of 
Imprisonment," is not applicable in this case to determine whether the 
sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, it would seem that in 
fact S 5G1.3 would be the appropriate Sentencing Guideline section to 
consult when sentences for federal and for state/territorial offenses 
cover 
related conduct. For example, Application Note 2 to S 5G1.3 discusses 
how to compute a federal sentence which may take into account, as 
Relevant Conduct, conduct for which a defendant has been convicted 
and sentenced in state court. If Simmonds had committed his offenses 
in a state rather than in a territory, he would have pled guilty in state 
court to the state burglary offense and in federal court to the federal 
arson offense and S 5G1.3 would have been applicable to determine if 
the federal sentence should run concurrently with or consecutively to the 
state sentence. See United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that a federal district court can require its sentence 
 
                                15 
  
Moreover, although 48 U.S.C. S 1614(b) states that 
"[w]here appropriate, the pr ovisions of part II of Title 18 
[Criminal Procedure] and of T itle 28 . . . shall apply to the 
district court and appeals therefrom," the applicability of 
part II of Title 18 is set forth in the following terms: "Except 
as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant who has 
been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal 
statute . . . shall be sentenced in accordance with the 
provision of this chapter." 18 U.S.C.S 3551(a). Thus, the 
scope of part II of Title 18 is defined in terms of sentences 
imposed for violations of federal law, not in terms of 
sentences imposed in federal courts. 
 
Our conclusion that the Sentencing Guidelines and the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3553 do not apply in this 
case is reinforced by the policy considerations addressed in 
Dowling. In rejecting the suggestion that the Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act apply to 
sentences for territorial violations imposed by the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands but not to sentences for 
territorial violations imposed by the Vir gin Islands 
Territorial Court, we noted in Dowling that "if the 
[Sentencing] Guidelines must be used in one court but not 
in the other, the prosecutor would have the option of 
choosing what range of punishment could be imposed for 
the particular crime" simply by selecting the appropriate 
court in which to bring charges. Dowling , 866 F.2d at 613. 
We reasoned that it "would be an anomalous situation, out 
of the mainstream of criminal law administration," to 
permit such forum shopping. Id. Because we concluded 
that the Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing Reform 
Act did not apply to sentences handed down by the V irgin 
Islands Territorial Court, we ultimately held that they 
likewise did not apply to sentences imposed by the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands for violations of Virgin Islands 
territorial law (in contrast to federal law). See id. at 615. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to be served consecutively with a yet to be imposed state sentence). It is 
only because uniquely in the Virgin Islands a defendant can be convicted 
of both the federal and the territorial offenses at the same time in 
federal 
court that the application of S 5G1.3 in such a situation is even 
debatable. 
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Because the Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing 
Reform Act do not apply in this case to the territorial 
violation, they cannot be reintroduced into the sentencing 
process by requiring that computation of the total sentence 
for the federal and territorial offenses be determined under 
the Guidelines. We must consider the two sentences 
separately. In regard to the sentence for the territorial 
offense, the laws of the Virgin Islands do not impose 
express limitations on a sentencing court's discretion to 
impose consecutive sentences for territorial criminal 
offenses. Furthermore, the laws of the Virgin Islands do not 
require specific factors to be consider ed when imposing 
consecutive sentences for territorial criminal of fenses. 
 
Here, in deciding to impose consecutive sentences, the 
District Court stated at the sentencing hearing that it did 
not believe that the 97 months on the federal arson count 
adequately achieved "the total punishment that is 
necessary and appropriate in this case." (App. at 57). 
Moreover, in discussing other aspects of its sentencing 
decision, the District Court emphasized that Simmonds was 
responsible for recruiting Gumbs, that Simmonds carried a 
gun during the burglary, that Simmonds gave Gumbs a 
gun to carry during the commission of the bur glary, and 
that Simmonds and Gumbs were the only individuals who 
stayed behind to set the fire. (App. at 28-30). In addition, 
the District Court explicitly addressed the seriousness of 
the offense: 
 
       It is a very just--entering someone's house, and even 
       when you think they're not there is bad enough, just a 
       regular burglary. 
 
       But then, when inside the house, it is found out that 
       it's owned by a federal official and a federal law 
       enforcement official, a prosecutor , and because of that 
       role, that job, the burglars escalate the crime to one of 
       arson, and they don't just set fire to the place, they . . . 
       set a bomb, in essence, by setting fire to a piece of 
       furniture and turning the gas on, it was only a matter 
       of time that there would have been a massive 
       explosion. 
 
       And it is only by chance, the grace of God, however you 
       wish to characterize it, that someone . . . first went in 
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       . . . [and] turned the gas off and attempted to fight the 
       fire until the firefighters arrived. 
 
       And that's what makes this crime so particularly 
       disturbing and so particularly an heinous one, and 
       deserving of a level of punishment for one such as Mr. 
       Simmonds who played a managerial or supervisory r ole 
       in the arson itself, as well as, of course, the initial 
       enterprise of the burglary. 
 
(App. at 55-56). The District Court also noted that 
Simmonds tried to elude the police after fleeing the scene of 
the crime. (App. at 56). 
 
In sum, the District Court clearly articulated r easons 
supporting its conclusion that the sentences should run 
consecutively. As such, we hold that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in its sentencing decision. 
 
C. Consultation of Other Pre-Sentence Investigation 
       Reports 
 
Simmonds finally argues that "[t]he trial court violated 
[his] right to due process by taking into account material 
included in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports ("PSI's") 
of other participants." Simmonds contends that these 
reports were not provided to him and that "he had no 
opportunity to respond" to the infor mation contained in 
these reports prior to the District Court's decision to make 
a three-point upward adjustment in his base offense level 
for playing a leadership, managerial and/or or ganizational 
role in the crimes to which he pled guilty. 
 
Although Simmonds contends that he objected to the 
District Court's decision to consult his co-defendants' PSI's, 
our careful review of the sentencing transcript belies this 
contention. While Simmonds did object to the District 
Court's decision to impose a three-point upwar d 
adjustment in his base offense level for playing a leadership 
role in the crimes to which he pled guilty, it is clear from 
the sentencing transcript that neither Simmonds nor his 
lawyer objected to the District Court's consultation of or 
reliance upon the PSI's of Simmonds's co-defendants. 
 
Simmonds does not contend that the information in his 
PSI or in the PSI's of his co-defendants was unr eliable or 
 
                                18 
  
untrustworthy. Instead, Simmonds contends only that the 
District Court violated his due process rights by consulting 
his co-defendants' PSI's prior to sentencing him and that 
the facts presented in these PSI's, when considered together 
with the facts in Simmonds's own PSI, demonstrate that 
Simmonds "was not a leader, organizer, manager or 
supervisor." 
 
We note, however, that the following sections of the PSI's 
of all five defendants are identical: Related Cases, The 
Offense Conduct, Defendants' Statement Regar ding the 
Planning of the Offense, Defendants' Statement Regarding 
the Burglary, Defendants' Statement Regar ding the Arson, 
and Victim Impact Statement. Therefor e, any error in 
reviewing the co-defendants' PSI's would be har mless 
because the relevant information is the same in each of 
them. Moreover, even a cursory r eview of Simmonds's own 
PSI provides ample support for the District Court's 
conclusion that Simmonds acted as a leader, manager 
and/or organizer. 
 
In arguing, furthermore, that the District Court violated 
his due process rights by denying him access to his co- 
defendants' PSI's, Simmonds acknowledges that, as a 
general rule, criminal defendants have no right to see or 
examine the PSI's of their co-defendants. See, e.g., United 
States v. Blanco, 884 F.2d 1577, 1577-78 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian , 486 U.S. 1 
(1988)). Furthermore, as Simmonds concedes in his brief, 
"the scope of what a trial court may consider in 
determining a[n appropriate] criminal sentence is 
breathtakingly broad." Not only have we held that a federal 
district court judge has almost unlimited discr etion in 
determining the appropriate sentence in a criminal case, 
see, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 198 F.3d 389, 391 (3d 
Cir. 1999), such discretion is a part of federal statutory law. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 3661 ("No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the backgr ound, character, and 
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court 
of the United States may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."); see also 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines S 1B1.4 (2000) ("In determining 
the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or 
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whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the 
court may consider, without limitation, any information 
concerning the background, character and conduct of the 
defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law."). 
 
Given the District Court's broad discretion to consider 
relevant information when sentencing a criminal defendant, 
we conclude that the District Court's decision to consult 
the PSI's of Simmonds's co-defendants did not constitute 
plain error. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we will affirm the District Court's 
judgment of sentence except for the inclusion of the value 
of the victims' lost insurance premium discounts in the 
restitution order. We r emand this case to the District Court 
so that Simmonds may be resentenced as to r estitution. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I join all portions of the Court's opinion other than Part 
III(A)(1). Because I conclude that the portion of the District 
Court's restitution order regar ding the destroyed furniture 
exceeded its authority, I would remand for r esentencing. 
 
Because the victims' insurance company, in accor dance 
with the terms of its policy, paid only the depreciated value 
of the furniture, the District Court or dered that the 
defendants pay the victims an amount equal to the 
depreciation they failed to receive fr om the carrier. The 
record does not explain how this depr eciation was 
calculated, but my colleagues appear to assume that 
receiving an amount equal to the depreciation would put 
the victims in a position to replace the lost furniture with 
new furniture at the time of the loss. They thus refer to this 
as the victims receiving "replacement value." 
 
Section 3663A(b)(1)(B) mandates restitution in the 
amount of the greater of the value of the pr operty destroyed 
at the time of the loss or at the time of sentencing. The 
value of lost property is most commonly r egarded as being 
the market value of the property, i.e., what a willing buyer 
would pay. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549-50 (7th ed. 
1999) (defining "value" as "the amount of goods, services, or 
money that something will command in an exchange" and 
both "market value" and "fair market value" as "[t]he price 
that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to 
pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction 
. . . ." while making no reference to"replacement value"), 
with id. at 349-50 (defining "replacement cost" as "[t]he cost 
of acquiring an asset that is as equally useful or productive 
as an asset currently held"). Thus, if the phrase is read 
literally, the value of the lost furnitur e is not the same as 
the value of new furniture. 
 
Even if one assumes that the value of the new fur niture 
is an acceptable reading of the value of the lost property, 
there is at least an ambiguity here on the face of the 
statute. The Court concedes that the ambiguity is not 
specifically resolved by the legislative history. As the Court 
acknowledges, this conclusion is requir ed by our holding in 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 46 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
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The Court ultimately holds that the admitted ambiguity 
is resolved by the general, overall purpose of the statute.1 
This holding is in direct conflict, however , with the teaching 
of the Supreme Court in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 
411 (1990). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hughey pleaded 
guilty to one count of fraud in exchange for the 
government's agreement to dismiss the r emaining counts. 
The government sought restitution pursuant to the Victim 
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3579, 3580, for damages stemming fr om all crimes with 
which Hughey had been charged, not simply the charge to 
which he had pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court held that 
the plain language of the VWPA limited r estitution orders to 
the harms flowing only from the of fense of which the 
defendant had been convicted. Most important for our 
purposes, the Supreme Court held that no appeal to "the 
expansive declaration of purpose accompanying VWP A," id. 
at 420, was warranted because "[e]ven wer e the statutory 
language regarding the scope of a court's authority to order 
restitution ambiguous, longstanding principles of lenity, 
which demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal 
statutes in favor of the defendant . . . preclude our 
resolution of the ambiguity against petitioner on the basis 
of general declarations of policy in the statute and 
legislative history," id. at 422. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court's references to various r estitution cases and to the 
Sentencing Guidelines in its footnote 3 are inapposite. In United States 
v. Sharp, 927 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir . 1991), the court held that lost 
income and costs of repairing a damaged mine were included in the 
restitution calculation. The defendants conceded that the replacement 
cost of a fan was properly included in the r estitution order, and, 
therefore, the court in Sharp did not have occasion to consider the 
propriety of so doing. The court in United States v. Akbani, 151 F.3d 
774, 779-80 (8th Cir. 1998), held that S 3663(b)(1) did not apply. 
Therefore, any pronouncement on the permissibility of replacement value 
in restitution orders is dictum. Sentencing Guidelines SS 2B1.1 & 2Q2.1 
both calculate "value" to determine a crime's significance. Value in this 
context is irrelevant to our effort to determine how much Congress is 
requiring the defendant to pay the victims in r estitution. United States 
v. 
Pemberton, 904 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1990), a Guidelines case and not a 
restitution case, is similarly irrelevant. 
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The rule of lenity, accordingly, would mandate that we 
construe any ambiguity in S 3663A(b)(1)(B) in favor of 
Simmonds. The Court's resolution of the ambiguity in favor 
of a more, rather than less, expansive definition of "value" 
is fundamentally inconsistent with the rationale behind the 
rule of lenity. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                23 
